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Information Opacity, Credit Risk, and the Design
of Loan Contracts for Private Firms
BY LUCY F. ACKERT, RONGBING HUANG, AND GABRIEL G. RAMı́REZ

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private
firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier.
The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from
that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender,
collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing
is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan
characteristics.

I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of the private debt market has been established in the literature.
For example, Houston and James (1996) find that the private debt of public and
private firms, including bank loans and private placements, encompasses approximately 76% of the corporate debt market. While bank financing of public firms
has received significant attention in recent years, bank financing of private firms
has received little attention. Using a large sample of bank loans from 1993 to 2003,
this paper provides important insight into the design of bank loans to private firms.
In making a loan decision, a lender needs to determine the quality of both the
firm and the loan. Unlike public firms, private firms are not required to regularly disclose information to the public through filings with the Securities and
Exchanges Commission (SEC). Private firms are also less likely to be followed
by financial analysts and credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and
Moody’s. Less disclosure and lack of credit rating exacerbate the information
opacity of private firms and make it more difficult to measure their credit risk.
Therefore, important, unresolved questions surround how loan contracts for private firms can be designed to alleviate the problems of information asymmetry and
credit risk.
The extant research shows that information asymmetry and credit risk are handled in a variety of ways in which price and non-price loan terms interplay. In
fact, private debt issuance through a bank loan is seen as providing a package of
n-contract terms (Melink and Plaut (1986)). The price and non-price terms, including collateral, maturity, covenants, and loan size, are complementary ways the
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lender can deal with borrower risk (Strahan (1999)). Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe
(2000) study private debt issued by public firms and provide evidence that debt
contract terms are driven by asymmetric information, contracting cost, and credit
risk. In a competitive market for bank loans without information frictions, the cost
of a loan to a borrower should reflect the riskiness of the borrower, as well as the
structure of the loan. This paper focuses on how bank loans to private firms are
designed differently from those to public firms due to information asymmetry and
credit risk.
We first examine the structure of bank loans. Importantly, our results suggest
that there are significant differences between the design of loans to private and
public firms. Consistent with prior research, we find that private firms are more
likely to borrow from a sole lender and provide collateral. Furthermore, private
firms are more likely to use sweeps in their loan contracts, although they do not use
dividend restrictions or financial ratio covenants more frequently than public firms.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has systematically contrasted
how private and public firms use covenants in bank loans. We also find that, after
accounting for firm size, loans to private firms are smaller than those to public
firms, while the loan maturities of private and public firms are not statistically
different.
Next, we develop and estimate an empirical model of the impact of firm-specific
factors, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions on the overall cost of a
loan. Our results suggest that firm and loan characteristics have similar directional
effects on yields, regardless of whether the firm is public or private, rated or
unrated. However, structural differences exist in the determination of yields for
private and public firms. A private firm would pay a lower yield on its loan if
it were public, holding constant the characteristics of the firm and loan, as well
as macroeconomic conditions. Similarly, a public firm would pay a higher yield
on its loan if it were private. Finally, consistent with the prediction of Rajan and
Winton’s (1995) model, a credit rating reduces the difference in predicted yields
on loans to private and public firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our empirical model and predictions. Section III details the sample construction and provides
descriptive statistics. Section IV examines the determinants of loan structure and
yields. Concluding remarks and directions for future research are in Section V.
II. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
A number of recent studies have investigated the borrower’s decision regarding the
source of debt capital and the particular structure of a debt contract for public firms
and report systematic relations between the non-price terms of loans and pricing
(Strahan (1999), Hubbard, Kuttner, Palia (2002), and Reisel (2004), among others).
We use this literature to guide our empirical hypotheses regarding the structure
and pricing of bank loans to private firms.
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LOAN STRUCTURE
Information asymmetry has been shown to impact the design of debt contracts
(Sufi (2007)). The information opacity of the borrower influences the level of
monitoring the lender must exercise. Because direct monitoring is costly, lenders
may use certain contracting features (collateral, syndication, covenants, loan size,
and maturity) to ameliorate the amount of direct monitoring (see Strahan (1999)
and Hubbard et al. (2002), among others). Because the existing theory provides
conflicting predictions regarding the relation between the characteristics of a loan
and the borrower, this paper provides important new evidence on the structure of
loans to private firms. 1
In their examination of syndicated loans, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) argue
that the quality of information about a borrower impacts the structure of a loan
contract. Loans to riskier firms might involve a larger number of lenders or a loan
syndicate so that the higher risk can be spread across multiple lenders. Private
firms are more opaque and generally riskier than public firms. However, that does
not necessarily imply that loans to private firms are more often syndicated. Loans
span a spectrum, with sole lender bank loans at one end, public debt at the other
end, and syndicated loans in the middle. Informationally opaque firms move from
bank loans toward lower cost public debt by establishing a strong credit reputation
(Diamond (1991a)). Syndicated loans are in the middle of this transition as they
have characteristics of both bank loans and public debt. In essence, there is a
trade-off between credit risk and the need for lender’s monitoring. Because a firm
with sparse information requires more intense monitoring, the structure of the loan
syndicate is closer to a sole lender bank loan while more reputable borrowers will
have dispersed syndicates. Sufi (2007) finds that the lead bank on the syndicate
retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate in
lending to private and smaller firms. Loans to the private firms in our sample
may be syndicated less often because these private firms have not moved from the
end of the spectrum at which sole lender bank loans are the norm and stringent
monitoring is required.
Another way to handle information asymmetry or risk is to use collateral. The
model by Rajan and Winton (1995) suggests that collateralized debt should be
observed more for firms that need monitoring. Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux
(2004) find that information asymmetry, moral hazard, and credit risk are important determinants of securitization. Similarly, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006)
provide evidence that the use and amount of loan collateral depends on the degree
of asymmetric information. If the lender knows the credit quality of the borrower,
risky borrowers may be asked to provide greater collateral than safe borrowers.
1

For example, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) note that theory provides no single predicted relation
between the use of collateral and borrower quality. Similarly, there are competing predictions regarding
the association between covenants and the credit standing of the borrower (Bradley and Roberts (2004),
and Paglia and Mullineaux (2001)).
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But, safer borrowers may be willing to provide greater collateral due to adverse
selection problems in the presence of incomplete information. As Jimenez et al.
(2006) note, further empirical investigation will provide insight into the relative
importance of these opposing forces. In addition, private and public firms may
also differ in the use of collateral in their loan contracts.
Another important loan design issue is covenants. The effective use of covenants
requires lenders to perform some level of monitoring and banks may demand
covenants on loans to riskier borrowers because covenants trigger the need for
renegotiation and potentially ward off bankruptcy (Rajan and Winton (1995)).
Based on a large sample of loans to public firms, Bradley and Roberts (2004)
conclude that borrower characteristics have significant implications for covenant
structure. To the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically examined whether
lenders to more informationally opaque private firms are more likely to demand
more restrictive covenants. In addition, unlike previous studies that use a single aggregate of covenants, we examine the use of three types of covenants:
sweeps, dividends restrictions, and financial ratios. Sweeps are mandatory repayment provisions, dividend restrictions limit distributions of cash flows to
shareholders, and financial ratio covenants provide an early warning system to
lenders. 2
When a loan is designed, the loan amount and maturity are determined simultaneously with the syndicate structure, securitization, and covenants. The literature
shows that lenders decrease their exposure to default risk by limiting the amount of
a loan and by shortening the maturity of the loan (Berger and Udell (1990), Strahan
(1999), Dennis et al. (2000), and Hubbard et al. (2002)). Thus, we would expect
loans to more informationally opaque firms to be smaller and have shorter maturities. Such relation between firms’ type and maturity can also be due to credit risk.
Existing theoretical work models a relation between credit risk and debt maturity.
For example, in Diamond’s (1991b) model, both risky and high quality borrowers
use debt with short maturities and medium risk quality borrowers use long-term
debt. Empirically, Berger, Espinoza-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), among others,
find that risky borrowers use short-term debt, whereas higher credit quality firms
use longer maturities.
As described subsequently, we present evidence on whether syndicate structure,
securitization, the presence of covenants, loan amount, and loan maturity affect
loan design for private firms as they are more informationally opaque and then
we investigate whether the structure of a loan differs for private and public firms.
We next examine how information asymmetry and credit risk impact the pricing
of loans to private firms compared to loans to public firms. Before turning to the
empirics, in the following section we provide a basis for predictions regarding the
cost of a loan.
2
This classification is consistent with the theoretical model of Berlin and Mester (1992) in which debt
contracts are written with covenants of varying degrees of restrictiveness with the purpose to reduce
agency problems.
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LOAN PRICING
Our empirical model of the loan yield takes the following form:
AISpreadi,j,t = f(firm, loan, and macroeconomic characteristics) + εi,j,t ,

(1)

where the yield or overall cost to borrower i of loan j at time t is measured by the
drawn all-in-spread (AISpread i,j,t ). 3 The characteristics of the firm impact loan
yields in several ways: credit risk, information asymmetry, and economies of scale
(Dennis et al. (2000), Strahan (1999), among others). Clearly, the yield on a loan
is closely tied to the riskiness of the borrowing firm, with higher yields demanded
to compensate for higher risk. Risk can be measured along several dimensions and
a firm’s credit or debt rating is a common control for riskiness (e.g., John, Lynch
and Puri (2003)). Thus, for firms with debt ratings, we expect yields to be lower
for those rated as investment grade.
However, the debt of private firms is often not rated because ratings are costly
(Kliger and Sarig (2000)). Firm size can be used as another measure to capture the
riskiness of a firm, with larger firms borrowing at lower cost. Firm size has also
been used to proxy for the information opacity of the firm. Large firms are more
likely to have well-developed reputations, more available information, and more
stable cash flows (Strahan (1999)). Because data on firm size is unavailable for
private firms, we use sales to proxy for firm size.
In addition to the characteristics of the firm, the design of a particular loan
impacts its pricing. The literature shows that lenders decrease their exposure to
default risk by simultaneously determining the syndicate structure, securitization, covenants, loan size, and loan maturity. However, empirical investigation
of the joint decision is problematic because the design choices and pricing are
interrelated. Simultaneous estimation, while conceptually appropriate, presents
formidable econometric issues with such a large system of equations and is practically impossible due to data availability limitations (Billet and Mauer (2007)).
One possible approach to address this endogeneity problem is to conduct reduced
form estimation. This is the approach followed in this paper. Accordingly, in our
empirical analysis we include only those variables that can be considered exogenous, such as investment grade, firm size, loan purpose, loan type, and industry
and time effects.
Control for additional characteristics is common in analyses of contract terms
(e.g., Dennis et al. (2000)) and we follow a similar approach in this paper. First,
loans are taken for various purposes and therefore have different risk characteristics. For example, the pricing of Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing is distinct
from other loans. A DIP loan is new debt secured during Chapter 11 bankruptcy
under Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (c)(1) (Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramı́rez
3

The all-in-spread is commonly used in the literature to measure promised yield spread. See, for
example, Dennis et al. (2000), Hubbard et al. (2002), Bradley and Roberts (2004), and Sufi (2007),
among others.
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(2003)). This kind of loan financing is unique because it has super-priority status
over existing claims. Other loan purpose variables we include are general corporate purposes, working capital, recapitalization, commercial paper backup, and
debt repayment, among others. Another consideration is loan type, which may
capture risk and maturity. Loans take the form of term loans, revolving credit
lines, 364-day facilities, and other tranches. Revolving facilities have significant
exposure uncertainty (takedown risk), 364-day facilities are not subject to regulatory capital requirements, and term loans typically have longer maturities, all of
which impact the cost of the loan. Finally, we include the year of loan issuance to
control for macroeconomic events. Our sample includes loans from 1993 through
2003, a period that includes both business cycle expansions and contractions. 4
The starting year is consistent with extant studies using the DealScan database.
We also include variables to control for industry effects, which can systematically
impact estimated relations.
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Using the empirical model presented in the previous section, we focus our analysis
on bank loans to private firms, which are compared with loans to public firms. We
use bank loan data from the Dealscan database, constructed by the Reuters Loan
Pricing Corporation (LPC). LPC collects data from submissions by banks and
SEC filings. As pointed out by Yasuda (2005), banks have incentives to selfreport on their transactions so that they obtain a higher rank when their deals are
included in the league table calculations done by LPC. Further, as reported in
Carey et al. (1998), Dealscan covers a significant fraction of the dollar amount of
outstanding consumer and industrial loans. Thus, it is not likely that private firms
are at a disadvantage in terms of bank loans represented in the database. To identify
private and public firms, we match this database with the CRSP database. A firm
is considered public if a CRSP identification number is available. 5 Loans made to
private firms are identified as those with no ticker or CRSP identification number. 6
The initial sample includes 29,414 private loans and 33,691 public loans from the
beginning of 1993 through the end of 2003. 7 After imposing some restrictions, as
Table 1 details, our final sample has 5,966 loans. Loan tranches or facilities are
sometimes packaged together as one deal. 8 Our observation unit is the tranche,
4
See the National Bureau pf Economic Research on defining periods of business cycle expansion and
contraction (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html).
5
Note that some loans are to firms with a ticker on DealScan but no CRSP identification number. These
loans are excluded from our sample because we could not clearly differentiate whether the borrower
was a public or private firm. Other researchers also exclude loans in this situation (e.g., Sufi (2007)).
6
We use both ticker symbols and company names to match the two databases, and also confirm that
each borrower is listed in CRSP on the date of loan issuance. When a ticker symbol is used for matching,
we further manually check company names, industry affiliation, and state to improve the quality of
matching.
7
We follow some researchers who exclude loans made prior to the early 1990s (Bradley and Roberts
(2004) and Sufi (2007)). We repeated the analyses reported subsequently in this paper and inferences
are unchanged when we include the early sample years.
8
In our sample, each deal includes 1.6 loans, on average, with a range of 1 to 8.
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Table 1. Sample Construction
The table reports details on the construction of our final sample of loans taken by
private and public firms using the LPC database for the period from January 1,
1993 through December 31, 2003.

Initial sample
U.S. firms
Excluding financials
Confirmed deals
Excluding deals that are sponsored
With sales data
With promised yield data (AISpread)
With maturity data
With information on whether the issue is secured
With data on covenants on dividend restrictions
With data on four sweep covenants
Excluding deals that have a ticker in LPC database
but are missing PERM or NAME in CRSP
Final sample of unrated loans
Final sample of rated loans

Loans of
Private Firms

Loans of
Public Firms

29,911
28,414
23,324
22,244
17,681
9,841
7,289
6,386
3,593
2,231
1,540
1,540

33,691
32,822
28,666
27,761
25,567
23,648
19,164
18,130
12,584
9,553
5,753
4,426

939
601

2,421
2,005

rather than the deal, even though lenders are not chosen independently within a
deal. The design of each loan within a deal, including maturity and coupon, can
differ markedly. Thus, the appropriate unit of analysis of loan pricing is the tranche
or facility.
We use the drawn all-in-spread (AISpread) in basis points (bps) to measure the
yield or overall cost to the borrower of a loan. The AISpread is defined by LPC
(1994) as the sum of the coupon spread, annual fees, and upfront fees expressed
as a mark-up over LIBOR. When a LIBOR quote is not available, LPC uses a
minimum spread and then applies a LIBOR differential. 9
Several filters are applied in order to allow the analyses that follow. First, we
exclude non-U.S. issuers, loans by financial institutions, and deals for which completion was unconfirmed. We exclude loans that are sponsored, with missing information on sales, promised yield, maturity, security, or covenants. Clearly our
sample significantly decreases with these filters. However, they are necessary to
allow the analyses reported subsequently. Furthermore, others have used similar
filters and our final sample is comparable in size, if not larger, to the final samples
analyzed in other studies. For example, Bradley and Roberts (2004) estimate their
covenant inclusion regressions with a maximum of 1,300 observations. In addition,
we examined the characteristics of the data excluded by our sample filters and find,
9

See Hubbard et al. (2002, footnote 7) for details on AISpread calculations.
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in general, that the data are similar. For example, for private rated firms included in
the final sample, the average maturity and yield spread are 55 months and 250 basis points, whereas for similar excluded firms the averages are 62 months and 245
basis points. One difference of note is in the average loan amounts. For included
(excluded) private rated firms the average is $478 ($300) million.
Because a credit rating reduces the information opacity of a borrower, we further
distinguish firms by availability of a credit rating in our investigation of the effect of
information problems on bank loan design. Thus, we partition the data as unrated or
rated, with the rating being that of the borrower’s senior debt provided by Standard
and Poor’s Corporation at close. Like credit ratings on bonds, credit ratings on loans
reflect the financial soundness of the borrower. However, unlike credit ratings on
bonds, collateral on loans can raise the loan credit rating up to one full rating above
the bond rating (Alex (1997)). We use bond ratings instead of bank loan ratings
because bond ratings are more appropriate for measuring the inherent risk of a
firm, which we wish to capture in our investigation of whether pricing differences
exist across rated and unrated firms with similar loan characteristics. Furthermore,
only a small fraction of loans in our sample have bank loan credit ratings.
Table 2 reports summary information for the borrowing firms and the sample
of loans. Descriptive statistics for private and public, unrated and rated firms are
reported in each panel. We performed tests of differences in means and proportions
for each category pair, comparing private, public, rated, and unrated firms. We
also find that our results are not driven by extreme observations. For brevity, these
results are not shown in the table but are available upon request.
Panel A includes some firm characteristics for unrated and rated firms. The
summary information indicates that the majority of the rated debt is speculative
grade (rating of less than BBB) for both private (87.5%) and public firms (73.1%)
in our sample. In addition, Panel A reports that loans are obtained by a wide variety
of firms across industries. 10
Panels B and C of Table 2 provide summary information, including means and
standard deviations, on sales, loan costs, and other characteristics for unrated and
rated firms, respectively. Our unreported t-tests suggest that average firm sales
(in millions of dollars) for firms with rated debt are significantly higher than the
average sales for comparable firms without rated debt, consistent with the finding
of Denis and Mihov (2003) that the debt of larger firms is rated more often. As
expected, the average yield spread (AISpread) is lowest for loans to public firms
with rated debt, and highest for unrated private firms. The average loan spread is
significantly higher for private firms than for comparable public firms. Not surprisingly, the average yield spread is much higher for firms with investment grade
debt than those with speculative grade debt, reflecting the importance of credit
risk. The average spread for public firms is significantly less than the spread for
10
Industry classifications follow Kenneth R. French’s seventeen industry portfolio as detailed on
his web site (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/), though we exclude financial
institutions.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports summary information for the borrowing firms and the sample
of loans. Descriptives for private and public, unrated and rated firms are reported
separately in each panel. For unrated and rated firms, Panel A includes the percent
of loans rated investment and speculative grades for borrowers who are rated by
Standard and Poor’s and the percent of loans obtained by firms by industry. For
unrated and rated firms, respectively, Panels B and C include the average and
the standard deviation of firm sales in millions of dollars, loan yield (AISpread
in bps), yield for investment grade and speculative grade debt, loan amount in
millions of dollars (LoanAmt), loan maturity in months (Maturity), the number
of lenders (NumLenders), the percent of syndicated loans (Syndicate), and the
percent of secured loans (Secured). Panels B and C also report the percent of loans
that specify three types of covenants, including sweeps, dividend restrictions, and
financial ratios. Next, the table reports the percent of loans that were issued for
DIP financing (DIP), general corporate purposes (Corp), working capital (WC),
recapitalization (Recap), commercial paper backup (CPBackup), debt repayment
(DebtRepay), and all other purposes. The bottom rows of Panels B and C report
the percent of loans by type, including term loans (Term), revolving credit lines
(Revolver), 364 day facilities (Day364), and all other tranches. Finally, Panel D
shows the distribution of loans across sample years.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics for Unrated and Rated Firms
Characteristic
Rating category (%)
Investment
Speculative grade
Industry classification (%)
Cars
Chemistry
Clothing
Construction
Consumers
Durables
Fabricated products
Food
Machinery
Mining
Oil
Retail
Steel
Transportation
Utilities
Other

Private Unrated Public Unrated Private Rated Public Rated
N/A

N/A

12.48
87.52

26.88
73.12

2.45
1.17
5.01
6.18
1.06
3.19
2.66
5.01
7.45
1.49
5.64
9.16
1.70
3.94
2.02
41.85

2.68
2.40
3.88
3.47
1.90
4.67
2.02
4.09
12.97
0.74
4.13
9.79
1.61
3.63
1.94
40.07

2.83
3.66
5.82
4.16
2.33
6.82
3.83
5.99
5.32
0.67
3.83
5.99
2.33
2.66
2.33
41.43

2.44
3.29
3.14
4.44
1.90
2.39
1.50
4.14
7.43
1.10
7.18
7.48
1.70
6.53
5.49
39.85
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Panel B: Additional Characteristics for Unrated Firms
Private Unrated

Sales (in millions)
AISpread (mean bps)
AISpread (mean bps)
Investment grade
Speculative grade
LoanAmt (mean in millions)
Maturity (mean in months)
Number of Lenders (mean)
Syndicate (%)
Secured (%)
Covenants (%)
Sweeps
Dividend restrictions
Financial ratios
Loan purpose (%)
DIP
Corp
WC
Recap
Acquisition
Takeover
CPBackup
DebtRepay
Spinoff
Other
Loan type (%)
Revolver
Day364
Term
Other

Public Unrated

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

$416
265.49

899
130.57

$717
226.42

4,575
131.90

–
–
212
48.42
5.03
83
89

–
–
783
23.74
6.31
–
–

–
–
162
45.49
5.21
91
83

–
–
281
22.45
6.11
–
–

71
94
85

–
–
–

70
92
89

–
–
–

3
10
10
5
9
17
0
37
4
5

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

0
12
15
1
6
21
1
40
1
3

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

59
1
35
4

–
–
–
–

65
3
28
4

–
–
–
–

Panel C: Additional Characteristics for Rated Firms
Private Rated
Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

$1,525
249.83

3,995
124.29

2,776
213.14

5,783
139.33

80.80
273.93

81.89
109.75

86.13
259.83

84.34
125.81

Mean
Sales (in millions)
AISpread (mean bps)
AISpread (mean bps)
Investment grade
Speculative grade

Public Rated

(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
LoanAmt (mean in millions)
Maturity (mean in months)
Number of Lenders (mean)
Syndicate (%)
Secured (%)
Covenants (%)
Sweeps
Dividend restrictions
Financial ratios
Loan purpose (%)
DIP
Corp
WC
Recap
Acquisition
Takeover
CPBackup
DebtRepay
Spinoff
Other
Loan type (%)
Revolver
Day364
Term
Other

478
54.66
9.21
97
88

918
22.64
9.91
–
–

812
51.97
13.35
99
74

1,416
25.25
12.80
–
–

81
92
86

–
–
–

74
86
90

–
–
–

1
11
12
6
3
26
3
35
1
2

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1
13
12
1
5
27
4
33
1
3

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

56
4
36
4

–
–
–
–

54
9
32
4

–
–
–
–

Panel D: Distribution of Loans Over Time

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Private
Unrated

Public
Unrated

Private
Rated

Public
Rated

32
29
159
208
183
90
70
63
39
53
13

11
64
281
399
455
304
251
187
152
196
121

12
12
73
67
97
87
56
64
42
42
49

51
47
142
269
254
255
162
213
217
226
169
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private firms for firms with speculative grade debt. For firms with investment grade
debt, however, the average yield spread for private firms is insignificantly lower.
The average loan amount (LoanAmt) is significantly lower for firms without
ratings. There are differences in the average loan maturity in months (Maturity)
across categories, with private firms having longer loan maturities than public
firms. Panels B and C of Table 2 also indicate that the average and the standard
deviation of the number of lenders, and the percentage of syndicated loans (Syndicate) are higher for firms with rated debt. The percentages of secured loans
(Secured) to private firms are greater than the percentages of secured loans for
comparable public firms.
Next, Panels B and C of Table 2 provide summary information on the use of
covenants. Although some previous studies use an aggregate covenant measure or
index, we include dummy variables for covenants of three types: sweeps, dividend
payouts, and financial ratios. Sweeps are mandatory repayment provisions that
specify how much of a loan must be repaid from excess cash flows, debt issuance,
equity issuance, and asset sales. The sweep dummy variable takes the value of one
for a loan that specifies any of these four sweeps. The dividend payout covenant
dummy equals one if there is any restriction that specifies the percent of net income
a borrower can pay to its shareholders in the form of a dividend. Financial ratio
covenants are restrictions based on various financial ratios of a borrower (e.g.,
interest coverage, debt to tangible net worth, and leverage ratios). The financial
ratio covenant dummy takes the value of one if any such restriction exists. No
significant difference exists in the use of sweeps between private and public firms
when a debt rating is not available, while private rated firms are more likely to
use sweeps than public rated firms. Loans to private firms are more likely to have
dividend restrictions and less likely to have financial ratio covenants than loans to
comparable public firms. 11
Panels B and C also reports the percentage of loans issued by purpose including
DIP financing (DIP), general corporate purposes (Corp), working capital (WC),
recapitalization (Recap), commercial paper backup (CPBackup), debt repayment
(DebtRepay), and all other purposes. A large fraction of the loans is issued for
general corporate, working capital, takeover, and debt repayment purposes. Finally, Panels B and C report the percentage of loans by type, including term loans
(Term), revolving credit lines (Revolver), 364 day facilities (Day364), and all other
tranches. The majority of loans are term loans or revolving credit agreements.
The final panel of Table 2 (Panel D) shows the distribution of loans across
sample years. The number of loans in each category peaks in the mid to late 1990s
(1996–1998). There is a consistent decline in the number of bank loans to private
unrated firms since 1996.
Sample statistics reported in this section indicate significant differences in the
characteristics of bank loans to private and public firms, without and with rated
11
Bradley and Roberts (2004) report a higher incidence of covenants for privately placed corporate
debt than for public debt. Our results are not directly comparable because our analysis compares bank
loans for private and public firms, rather than the private and public debt of public firms.
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debt. In particular, firms with rated debt tend to be larger and take larger loans
with more covenants and more lenders. In the following section, we formally
analyze loan structure and yield spread to provide insight into how private and
public firms design their loan contracts differently and whether these firm and
loan characteristics translate into differences in the cost of the loan.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE DESIGN OF LOAN CONTRACTS
We examine the structure and pricing of bank debt using our sample of 5,966 bank
loans to private and public, unrated and rated firms. As described subsequently,
we observe significant differences in the design of debt contracts across private
and public firms. At the same time, loan pricing is relatively similar as banks use
non-price features of debt contracts to control for variation in risk arising from
differences in the information environments surrounding private and public firms.
LOAN STRUCTURE
To investigate whether the structure of loans by private firms differ from those of
public firms, we analyze five typical loan terms. First, we examine the probability
that the loan will be syndicated, collateralized, or include any of three covenants:
sweeps, dividend restrictions, and financial ratios. Because the dependent variable is qualitative, we use a logistic regression model. In logit regressions, the
probability that an event occurs is
Pr(y = 1) =

exp(Xβ1 )
,
exp(Xβ0 ) + exp(Xβ1 )

(2)

where X represents firm characteristics, loan structure, and year dummies. We
consider five events. Syndication is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is
syndicated, and zero otherwise. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if
the loan is collateralized, and zero otherwise. Sweep Covenants, Dividend Restrictions, and Financial Ratio Covenants are also dummy variables, as defined earlier.
Secondly, we investigate the loan amount and maturity. We estimate two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variables are the natural
logarithms of the loan amount and the one plus the loan maturity (in months).
The independent variables are as follows. Private is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one (zero) for private (public) firms. We include the natural logarithm of
sales (Ln(Sales)) to control for size effects, and investment and speculative grade
dummies, which take the value one for firms with investment and speculative
ratings. 12 In addition, because loans are taken for various purposes and therefore
have different risk characteristics, we include loan purpose and loan type dummies.
Finally, to control for macroeconomic events, we include the year of loan issuance.
12
Our sample firms fall into one of the following three categories: investment grade, speculative grade,
or unrated.
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Table 3 presents the estimated logit and OLS regressions. For the logit regressions, we report marginal effects with z-statistics in parentheses instead of the
coefficient estimates because the regression function is nonlinear. The marginal
effect reflects the estimated change in the probability of syndication, collateralization, or each type of covenant inclusion.
Consistent with Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Sufi (2007), private firms are
less likely to be syndicated. Consistent with Diamond (1991a), larger (as measured
by sales) and investment grade firms in our sample syndicate more often because
they move from bank loans toward syndication as they develop a strong reputation.
At the same time, speculative grade firms also syndicate more often, in this case
because the risk can be spread across multiple lenders, as suggested by Dennis
and Mullineaux (2000). We also find that loans to private firms and smaller firms
are more likely to require collateral. Furthermore, collateral is less (more) likely
to be required for loans to firms with (below) investment grade debt. The results
regarding the determinants of collateral are consistent with Gonas et al. (2004) and
suggest the importance of information asymmetry and credit risk.
Previous research has not examined whether private and public firms use
covenants differently. We find that loans to private firms are more likely to include sweeps, because of either higher risk or more information opacity. Loans
to low risk firms are less likely to include sweeps and dividend restrictions while
those to high risk firms are more likely to do so. Private firms are more likely
to include dividend restrictions in their loan contracts, although the coefficient
is not statistically significant. Large firms are less likely to have dividend restrictions in their loan contracts. We do not find any statistically significant relation between information opacity or riskiness and the likelihood of financial ratio
covenants.
Though only marginally significant (p-value < 0.10), private firms tend to have
smaller loans. At the same time, larger and rated firms have larger loans. Our final
regression examines the maturity structure of loans. Loan maturities to private
and public firms are not significantly different. Larger firms make longer maturity
loans (p-value < 0.10). We also find that investment grade firms have shorter
maturity loans than speculative grade firms and both have longer maturity loans
than unrated firms.
LOAN PRICING
The existing literature presents little evidence on the pricing of bank loans to private
firms possibly due to data availability problems. In this paper, we provide insight
into the determination of loan yields for private and public firms. We separately
examine four categories of firms (private unrated, public unrated, public rated, and
private rated) to control for potential structural differences. For each of the four
categories of firms, we regress yield spread (AISpread) on firm and loan characteristics, while controlling for sample year. We estimate the model in reduced
form because of the potential simultaneity bias that results with endogenously

0.024 (2.30)∗
−0.002 (−0.47)
−0.218 (−7.95)∗∗
0.054 (5.28)∗∗
−0.115 (−1.59)
−0.145 (−3.63)∗∗
−0.079 (−2.17)∗
−0.014 (−0.34)
0.009 (0.27)
0.059 (2.32)∗
−0.095 (−1.66)
−0.092 (−2.99)∗∗
−0.045 (−0.91)
0.102 (13.39)∗∗
−0.115 (−4.42)∗∗
0.39
5,966

0.047 (3.55)∗∗
−0.042 (−9.04)∗∗
−0.288 (−9.65)∗∗
0.091 (7.66)∗∗

0.10 (3.39)∗∗
0.05 (2.09)∗
0.064 (2.71)∗∗
0.075 (2.45)∗
0.061 (2.41)∗
0.078 (3.31)∗∗
−0.012 (−0.27)
0.062 (2.45)∗
0.058 (1.71)

0.089 (8.32)∗∗
−0.146 (−5.54)∗∗
0.35
5,966

−0.011 (−2.70)∗∗
0.014 (10.18)∗∗
0.013 (1.97)∗
0.022 (5.14)∗∗

−0.019 (−0.92)
−0.045 (−3.16)∗∗
−0.038 (−2.72)∗∗
−0.002 (−0.20)
0.008 (0.97)
0.008 (0.98)
−0.009 (−0.42)
−0.006 (−0.66)
–

0.0013 (0.53)
0.001 (0.10)
0.29
5,966

( ) Significant at the 1% (5%) level

∗∗ ∗

Private
Ln(Sales)
Investment grade
Speculative grade
Loan purpose
DIP
Corp
WC
Recap
Acquisition
Takeover
CPBackup
DebtRepay
Spinoff dum
Loan type
Term
Day364
R2
Observations

(3) Sweep
Covenants

(2)
Collateral

(1)
Syndication

Pr(y = 1) =

0.025 (3.89)∗∗
−0.023 (−2.04)∗
0.23
5,966

–
0.004 (0.23)
0.018 (1.03)
0.052 (2.34)∗∗
0.010 (0.46)
0.033 (1.97)∗
0.018 (0.95)
0.016 (0.90)
0.031 (1.36)∗∗

0.007 (0.82)
−0.017 (−6.46)∗∗
−0.109 (−6.74)∗∗
0.048 (5.22)∗∗

(4) Dividend
Restrictions

0.025 (3.89)∗∗
−0.023 (−2.04)∗
0.32
5,966

–
0.004 (0.23)
0.018 (1.03)
0.052 (2.34)∗∗
0.010 (0.46)
0.033 (1.97)∗
0.018 (0.95)
0.016 (0.90)
0.031 (1.36)∗∗

−0.006 (−0.63)
−0.000 (−0.10)
−0.009 (−0.58)
−0.004 (−0.40)

(5) Financial
Ratio Covenants

−0.040 (−0.58)
0.123 (4.64)∗∗
0.61
5,966

−0.529 (3.62)∗∗
−0.322 (−3.70)∗∗
−0.402 (−4.59)∗∗
0.101 (1.01)
0.181 (1.85)
0.470 (5.86)∗∗
0.157 (1.18)
−0.099 (−1.29)
0.274 (1.89)

−0.069 (−1.68)
0.544 (27.00)∗∗
0.672 (9.34)∗∗
0.512 (11.22)∗∗

(6)
Ln(LoanAmt)

0.214 (14.35)∗∗
−1.187 (−48.15)∗∗
0.31
5,966

−0.942 (−10.67)∗∗
−0.297 (−5.94)∗∗
−0.275 (−5.72)∗∗
0.031 (0.52)
−0.074 (1.34)
−0.051 (−1.13)
−0.182 (−3.46)∗∗
−0.157 (−3.54)∗∗
−0.042 (−0.54)

0.005 (0.23)
0.011 (1.68)
0.137 (4.28)∗∗
0.201 (10.20)∗∗

(7)
Ln(1+Maturity)

exp(Xβ1 )
,
exp(Xβ0 ) + exp(Xβ1 )
where X represents firm characteristics, loan structure, and year dummies. Syndication is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is syndicated, and
zero otherwise. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is collateralized. Sweep Covenants equals one if there is a repayment provision
based on excess cash flow, assets sales, debt issuance or equity issuance. Dividend Restrictions equals one if there is any restriction on dividend payout.
Financial Ratio Covenants equals one if there is any restriction based on financial ratios. For (1)–(5), marginal effects and z-statistics (in parentheses) are
reported. In the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (6)–(7), the dependent variables are the natural log of the loan amount and the natural log of one
plus maturity in months, respectively. For (6)–(7), coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. Dummy variables for industry and sample year
are included in each regression, though the estimates are not reported in the table. The z-statistics and t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
adjusted for clustering at the deal level.

In the logit regressions (1)–(5), the probability that an event occurs is
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determined right-hand-side variables (Woodridge (2006)). 13 These variables represent the dependent variable of the five models in Table 3. With a reduced form
model we obtain consistent estimates using OLS. Table 4 reports the results of
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis. Below each coefficient estimate are
t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) method and for
clustering within each deal using Roger’s (1993) method.
The independent variables are as defined in the previous section and include a
dummy variable for investment grade, the natural logarithm of sales (Ln(Sales)),
and dummy variables for the loan purpose and loan type. 14 The regressions also
include dummy variables to control for industry and sample year, though this final
set of estimates is not reported in the table.
The estimated coefficients reported in the first two columns of Table 4 indicate
that the size of the firm has a significant effect on yields for unrated, private and
public firms, with larger firms having lower yields, as expected. Loan purpose
and type also have significant effects on observed yields. DIP financing generally
commands a large risk premium for private unrated firms and the yields on term
loans are significantly higher than the yields on other types of loans.
The estimated models for yields on private and public unrated debt indicate that
loans to private unrated firms are priced similarly to loans to public unrated firms.
Even though we have many more observations for public, unrated firms (2,421
compared to 939), the fit of the estimated models is fairly similar (R2 of 34%
compared to 36%). However, a Chow test comparing the fitted models reported
in the first two columns of Table 4 indicates that the coefficients are significantly
different (F-statistic = 4.23, p < 0.01, numerator (denominator) degrees of freedom = 38 (3,284)). Thus, structural differences exist in the pricing of unrated,
private and public loans. This finding is consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003)
who conclude that public firms are more transparent because they produce “hard”
information necessary to establish and continue market accessibility, and consequently, ongoing monitoring is easier. Sufi (2007) uses a similar dichotomy of
private and public firm status to proxy for information opacity. When pricing a
loan to a private firm, a financial intermediary often has limited external information regarding credit quality. With limited public data, there is greater reliance on
13
To examine the potential impact of loan design on pricing, we re-estimated the OLS regressions
reported in Table 4 with the seven dependent variables in Table 3 as additional explanatory variables and
inferences are unchanged. Results are available upon request. Similar structural approach is common in
the literature (See Sufi (2007) for example). Though single-equation, OLS estimates are inconsistent in
the case of simultaneity, it is not clear how far the estimates deviate from consistent estimates (Greene
(1997)). In fact, OLS is the most frequently used estimator and the properties of the estimates may not
suffer too much in the case of simultaneity. As in many macroeconomic models, classification of loan
variables as strictly endogenous or exogenous is difficult, if not impossible. In addition, on a practical
note, the implementation of a simultaneous estimation requires an expanded data set not yet available,
as private firms do not report their financial data. Thus, we view our approach as investigative and our
goal is to provide direction for future empirical investigations of the determinants of loan yields in the
private sector.
14
Because we examine unrated and rated firms separately, only one rating dummy is needed for the
rated firms.

∗∗ (∗ )

Significant at the 1% (5%) level

Constant
Investment grade
Ln(Sales)
Loan purpose
DIP
Corp
WC
Recap
Acquisition
Takeover
CPBackup
DebtRepay
Spinoff dum
Loan type
Term
Day364
R2
Observations

Dependent: Ln(AIS drawn)

Public Firms
8.19 (22.28)∗∗
–
−0.18 (−13.12)∗∗
0.67 (3.16)∗∗
0.07 (0.85)
0.12 (1.45)
0.03 (0.16)
0.08 (0.90)
0.03 (0.4)
−0.37 (−2.13)∗
−0.02 (−0.28)
−0.18 (−1.09)
0.31 (13.62)∗∗
−0.43 (−5.80)∗∗
0.36
2,421

Private Firms

7.88 (21.86)∗∗
–
−0.14 (−8.13)∗∗

0.62 (4.11)∗∗
−0.01 (−0.09)
0.08 (1.00)
−0.12 (−1.18)
−0.13 (−1.41)
−0.06 (−0.63)
−0.53 (−1.61)
−0.05 (−0.53)
−0.08 (−0.62)

0.29 (9.23)∗∗
−0.33 (−1.15)
0.34
939

Unrated Firms

0.15 (4.32)∗∗
−0.18 (−1.38)
0.65
601

0.53 (1.58)
0.17 (0.53)
0.23 (0.72)
0.32 (1.00)
0.31 (0.91)
0.25 (0.77)
−0.03 (−0.10)
0.11 (0.36)
0.12 (0.26)

6.72 (10.92)∗∗
−1.07 (−7.20)∗∗
−0.08 (−3.42)∗∗

Private Firms

Public Firms

0.27 (12.19)∗∗
−0.37 (−6.86)∗∗
0.71
2,005

0.43 (2.57)∗∗
0.14 (2.04)∗
0.14 (2.12)∗
0.46 (4.24)∗∗
0.05 (0.67)
0.18 (3.06)∗∗
0. 11 (1.28)
0.05 (0.83)
0.59 (4.24)∗∗

6.74 (24.25)∗∗
−0.94 (−18.71)∗∗
−0.05 (−3.78)∗∗

Rated Firms

The table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistics for regressions of logged yield spreads (Ln(AISpread)) for loans of unrated
and rated, private and public firms. The t-statistics reported below each coefficient estimate in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the deal level. Dummy variables for industry and sample year are included in each
regression, though the estimates are not reported in the table.
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qualitative models that make use of soft information. Lenders to private firms are
particularly reliant on soft information resulting in costlier information production
and monitoring.
Because the existence of a credit rating suggests less information opacity, we
distinguish firms with and without credit ratings in our investigation of the effect
of information problems on the pricing of bank loans. The last two columns of
Table 4 present estimated coefficients for the yield regressions for rated, private
and public firms. As expected, investment grade private and public firms have a
lower cost of debt compared to speculative grade firms, reflecting a lower level
of credit risk. Other estimated coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude to
those of unrated firms discussed previously. As before, the fit of the estimated
models is fairly similar (R2 of 65% compared to 71%) for rated private and public
firms even though our sample includes many more loans to public firms (601
compared to 2,005). A Chow test comparing the fitted models reported in the last
two columns of Table 4 indicates that the coefficients are significantly different
(F-statistic = 3.63, p < 0.01, numerator (denominator) degrees of freedom = 39
(2,528)). Therefore, the pricing of loans to private and public firms is structurally
different.
To better understand the relative pricing of loans to private and public firms, we
estimate the implied yield spread on a bank loan to a private firm assuming it was
a public firm, and vice versa. We first estimate the actual mean yield spread for
private unrated firms using estimated coefficients from the regression for private
unrated firms from Table 4. Then, we compute the hypothetical mean yield spread
for these private unrated firms as if they were public firms using the estimated
coefficients from the regression for public unrated firms from Table 4. We repeat
this procedure for private rated, public unrated, and public rated firms. Results are
presented in Table 5.
We find that if a loan to an unrated private firm was made to an unrated public firm, the predicted yield spread is 211.63 bps, holding constant the firm and
the loan’s other characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. The actual mean
yield spread for loans to private unrated firms is significantly higher (243.16 bps).
Similarly, the hypothetical yield spread for a loan to an unrated public firm is significantly higher (233.93 bps) than the actual yield spread (203.00 bps). Results
are similar for rated firms although the difference in the cost of loans to private
and public firms is reduced, possibly for the following reasons. First, information
opacity for a private firm is lower when a credit rating is available. Second, the
inclusion of the investment grade dummy controls somewhat for the difference in
credit risk across private and public firms.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper examines the structure and cost of loans to private and public firms using
a large sample of bank loans. In particular, we provide important new evidence
on the design of bank loans to private firms. We find that the structure of bank

Information Opacity, Credit Risk, and the Design of Loan Contracts

239

Table 5. Actual versus Hypothetical Mean Yields
This table compares the actual and hypothetical mean yields. The actual mean
yields for private (public) unrated (rated) firms are calculated using estimated
coefficients from the regression for private (public) unrated (rated) firms from
Table 4, respectively. The hypothetical mean yields for private (public) unrated
(rated) firms are calculated using estimated coefficients from the regression for
public (private) unrated (rated) firms from Table 4, respectively. The difference
between the actual mean and the hypothetical mean and the t-test statistic for the
difference in means (in parentheses) are also reported.

Private unrated
Public unrated
Private rated
Public rated
∗∗ (∗ )

Actual Mean

Hypothetical Mean

Difference

N

243.16
203.00
235.46
199.08

211.63
233.93
222.69
206.67

31.53 (18.90)∗∗
−30.93 (−37.03)∗∗
12.77 (6.37)∗∗
−7.58 (−6.56)∗∗

939
2,421
601
2,005

Significant at the 1% (5%) level

loans to private firms is significantly different from that of public firms. If a firm
is private, a bank loan is more likely to involve a sole lender, be collateralized,
be smaller, and have sweep covenants than if the firm is public. We also find that
the cost of a bank loan to a private firm is higher than that to a public firm even
after controlling for loan characteristics, firm size, and macroeconomic factors.
The existence of a credit rating decreases the difference in the cost of loans to
private and public firms. These results are consistent with loan costs reflecting
information differentials across firms.
Our results have important implications for the banking industry because we
find that the structure and pricing of bank loans to private firms are unique, as
compared to public firms. Lenders use price and non-price terms such as syndication, securitization, and covenant composition to deal with information opacity
and borrower risk.
Little previous research provides evidence on the pricing of private debt financing to private firms. Although this paper provides evidence on the characteristics
and pricing of bank loans, much work remains. For example, loan spreads are
determined simultaneously with other features of the loan, including term to maturity, security, and the number of lenders. Due to limitations in data accessibility,
current research on these issues is limited and future research is encouraged.
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